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Ireco1s brief can be summed up very simply: take the 
trial court's findings from which Megabar has not appealed and try 
to sneak the processor through under the same umbrella. Confuse 
the issue by blending together the evidence and law relating to 
the product (cast explosive compositions) with the evidence 
and law relating to the equipment that can be used to 
manufacture this product as well as other products expressly 
exempted from this litigation. This over-reaching prompted this 
appeal in the first place. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE THAT IRECO'S CONTINUOUS 
PROCESSOR WAS A TRADE SECRET 
Ireco has no trade secret unless it has a secret. 
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98 
(Utah 1981). In its appeal brief, just as at trial, Ireco argues 
cast explosive compositions and then tacks the processor on to 
cast explosive compositions without supporting evidence or law. 
Neither Ireco nor the trial court ever identified any secret that 
distinguished Ireco1s process equipment from equipment generally 
used to process energetic materials. 
Ireco's brief offers only the following argument to 
support a claim that Ireco's continuous processor was a trade 
secret: Ireco1s processor was a trade secret because Megabar filed 
a patent application on Megabar's processor. Ireco assumes a fact 
contrary to the evidence — that the Ireco machine is the Megabar 
machine. Megabar has set forth in its Appellants' Brief the many 
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differences of record between the Megabar and Ireco processors. 
(R. 2224-26). Ireco1s own expert testified to the fundamental 
differences in the machines. (R. 2184). 
Ireco1s argument is further flawed by reliance on the 
opinion of persons who are not patent experts. The belief of 
Megabar employees as to the patentability of Megabar1s machine 
provides no basis for Ireco to claim a secret as to Ireco1s 
machine. Furthermore, Megabar formally abandoned its patent 
application when it learned that others had patented the basic 
elements of Megabar*s continuous processor. Ireco1s entire 
argument is moot. 
Ireco ignores Utah's standard for proving a trade 
secret. Utah law requires proof of a device "which is USED in 
one's business" and that gives a competitive advantage. J&K 
Computer Systems, Inc. v. Parrishy 642 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 
1982) (emphasis added). Ireco offered no evidence that it ever 
used its processor in its business. To the contrary, Ireco had to 
admit that it had dismantled its processor. (R. 1955). By 
dismantling its machine, Ireco prevented itself from obtaining any 
competitive advantage. 
At trial, Ireco offered no evidence that its processor 
was a trade secret. On appeal, Ireco argues that Megabarfs one-
time belief that Megabar!s processor was patentable confers trade 
secret status on Ireco1s processor as a matter of law. There is 
no such law. 
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Neither Ireco nor the trial court defined the content or 
boundaries of any Ireco trade secret relating to processing 
equipment. The evidence preponderates against any finding of an 
Ireco trade secret in processing equipment. 
lie THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE THAT MEGABAR USED IRECO1S 
PROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY 
As discussed in Megabar's original brief, a trade secret 
plaintiff must prove not only that it has a secret, but also that 
the defendant used that secret. Microbiological Research Corp. 
v, Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98 (Utah 1981). Ireco's brief 
argues that Megabar based its processor on Ireco1s technology. 
However, Megabar outlined in its original brief Ireco's lack of 
evidence that Megabar used Ireco information. 
The trial testimony was that John Peterson developed 
Megabar's processor independently. (R. 2218, 2222-27). Lacking 
evidence, Ireco cites an Ireco chart showing superficial 
similarities between the machines. Ireco also cites testimony 
that Harvey Jessop developed a machine at Ireco and that Taylor 
Abegg worked at Ireco while Jessop developed a machine. None of 
the above is evidence that Megabar used any Ireco information — 
secret or otherwise — in development of the machine John Peterson 
designed without any input from Harvey Jessop. (R. 2220-28). 
III. THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF EVIDENCE OF INJURY 
Ireco has no trade secret cause of action unless Megabar 
injured Ireco by using an Ireco secret about processors. 
Muna, supra . Citing J&K Computer Research, 642 
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P.2d 732, 735, Ireco argues that the "essential element" for 
injury is value. (Ireco Brief p. 25). However, what J&K 
actually says at 735 is that a trade secret is a device "USED 
in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know it." (Emphasis 
added). No mention is made of injury or value. Ireco1s standard 
has no basis in law. Furthermore, even if value were the standard 
for determining injury under Utah law, the only evidence of record 
is that Irecofs processor had no value. The best evidence of the 
value of Ireco1s machine is Ireco1s own evaluation: Ireco 
dismantled its machine. 
Ireco also claims that it was injured because Megabar 
made disclosures about Megabarfs machine. Once again, contrary to 
the evidence at trial, Ireco assumes that the two machines are 
one. The critical question is how Ireco could be injured by 
disclosures about a machine it scrapped. Ireco had no plans to 
use the machine, made no attempt to market it and cannibalized the 
machine for parts to use in other equipment. 
As if saying would make it so, Ireco repeats "it is clear 
that Ireco was injured by Megabar1s misappropriation of IrecoTs 
processing technology." (Ireco Brief at 25). Ireco makes not one 
citation to the record and has no finding of fact to support its 
assertion of injury related to the processor. The evidence 
preponderates that Ireco was not injured by anything Megabar did 
with Megabarfs processor. 
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For the element of injury, as for all other elements of a 
trade secret case, Ireco relied entirely at trial upon evidence 
relating to cast explosive compositions. After convincing the 
trial court that Ireco was injured by Megabar's appropriation of 
information about cast explosive compositions, Ireco simply 
drafted findings to cover everything else Megabar had invented, 
safely trusting to the trial court's indignation and its own 
protestations that whatever touched a cast explosive composition 
was secret. But even Ireco stopped short at drafting a finding of 
fact claiming injury stemming from a processor Ireco had 
scrapped. Now Ireco asks this Court to accept its assertion of 
injury without any support in the record. 
IV. IRECO HAS NO INDEPENDENT GROUNDS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF RELATED 
TO ITS PROCESSOR. 
Ireco apparently argues that, since Megabar induced Mr. 
Jessop to leave Ireco in a manner found to violate his employment 
contract, the court could properly award punitive damages in the 
form of the present injunction. Ireco1s reliance for this 
proposition on Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 449 S.W.2d 
87 (Tex. 1973), is misplaced. In that case a jury had returned a 
verdict of damages, including punitive damages. The court 
concluded that inducement to breach an employment contract 
supported such an award. In this case, however, Judge Sawaya 
stayed for later hearing all questions of damages, and those 
questions were ultimately settled out of court. To now argue that 
the subject injunction is somehow supportable as a measure of 
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exemplary damage not only finds no basis in law, it is 
inconsistent with the prior action of the parties* 
Moreover, Ireco1s assertion of tortious interference with 
contractual relations is inapplicable for lack of proof of 
injury. Any relief Ireco might have against Harvey Jessop based 
on his contract is not at issue here. Harvey Jessop is not before 
the court and Megabar was not a party to his contract. Ireco must 
have proved as to Megabar all the elements of tortious 
interference, and one of those elements is plaintiff's damage. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977), cited in Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Utah 1983). 
As discussed above, Ireco offered no evidence of injury 
related to the processor, the trial court found no injury, and 
Ireco admitted it had abandoned its processor. But even if Ireco 
had suffered damage related to the processor, it would have a 
complete remedy at law and no right to the processor injunction 
that has been stayed by the trial court. Ireco overreaches law 
and equity in asking this Court to enjoin Megabar from using its 
independently developed processor when Ireco has abandoned its own 
inferior processor. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ireco asserts that its processing technology was 
"inextricably bound up with cast explosive compositions," (Ireco 
Brief at 25) yet Ireco offered no evidence that its processor was 
uniquely linked to cast explosive compositions. Ireco1s view is 
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that everything it "had done and thought of and planned on 
doing....constituted trade secrets." (R. 1679). Contrary to Utah 
law and the requirements of proof of each element of a trade 
secret for each alleged trade secret, Ireco obtained a judgment 
consistent with its own sweeping view of trade secrets. 
Ireco argues that the trial court enjoys an advantaged 
position with respect to witnesses. But the appellate court with 
the record before it is in the ideal position to apply objectivity 
and distance. The trial court focused on appropriation of an 
explosives formulation secret, and thereafter failed to apply Utah 
trade secret law to the processor question. Without evidence of a 
secret, use or injury relating to the processor, the trial court 
simply swept the processor within the judgment as Ireco asked. It 
is for this Court to prevent a "kitchen sink" approach to trade 
secret law and to reverse the judgment below with respect to 
processor technology. 
DATED this 7^ day of Decembers 1986 
X, 
Michele Mitchell 
FABIAN St CLENDENIN 
a Professional corporation 
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